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Nudging Parents
Meredith J. Harbach"
Abstract: Childcare quality matters, and parents intuitively
understand that it does. Among the features of childcare parents
most value, quality is regularly at the top of the list. Yet experts
consistently rate childcare quality in the United States as
mediocre at best. Why the disconnect? This Article argues that
behavioral market failure is an important piece of the puzzle.
Standard economic theory assumes parents are rational market
actors, and even market failure theory cannot account for their
imperfect rationality. But the paradox of poor childcare quality
is not just market failure; it's behavioral market failure. This
diagnosis not only helps us understand the market's
dysfunction, but also enables us to think creatively about
solutions. Armed with insights from behavioral economics,
policymakers can identify, and in some cases capitalize on,
parents' behavioral anomalies, "nudging" them toward their
desired childcare goals. Nudging parents is an important step
toward building a better network of childcare to care for,
nurture, and develop America's children.
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INTRODUCTION

In the United States the market, rather than family members, provides a
significant percentage of the care for America's young children, especially from
birth through age five, before most will begin formal elementary schooling. 1 The
quality of that care matters, and parents understand that it does. They report
quality is an important feature in weighing childcare options for their children, 2

1
In this Article, references to "childcare" mean care provided to children under age six provided by
someone other than parents or legal guardians. See NAT'L Ass'N OF CHILD CARE RES. & REFERRAL
AGENCIES, CHILD CARE: LIKE THE MILITARY, IS IT TIME FOR SHARED RESPONSIBILITY? 6 (2011),
http ://naccrra.com/sites/default/tiles/pub Iications/naccrra_pub Iicati ons/2012/child_care_I ike_ the_m i1
itary.pdf [hereinafter LIKE THE MILITARY]. The primary categories of non-family care are childcare
centers, group home childcare, family childcare, and in-home childcare. See Child Care and
Development Fund, 45 C.F.R. § 98.2 (2014).
2
See ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & VIRGINIA D. ALLHUSEN, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CHILDCARE
51-62, 179-87 (2005); ANGELA BROWNE MILLER, THE DAY CARE DILEMMA: CRITICAL CONCERNS
FOR AMERICAN FAMILIES 198 (1990) (listing staff warmth as the most important feature of a child
care program, followed by educational program and social activities); NAT'L Ass'N OF CHILD CARE
RES. & REFFERAL AGENCIES, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS OF CHILD CARE IN THE UNITED STATES, 5
(Nov. 2008), http://usa.childcareaware.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/03/2009_parents_perception_
report-r3.pdf [hereinafter NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS]; Debby Cryer, et al., Parents'
Perceptions of their Children's Child Care: A Cross-National Comparison, 17 EARLY CHILDHOOD
RESEARCH Q. 259, 267 (2002) (giving high importance to aspects of childcare reflected in professional
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and many report quality is the most important feature. 3 Likewise, many parents
believe their children are in fact receiving high quality childcare. 4
Yet the average quality of childcare nationwide is mediocre at best. 5
Childcare experts characterize the market as a "tragedy," 6 a "national scandal,"
definitions of childcare quality); G. Anne Bogat & Leah K. Gensheimer, Discrepancies Between the
Attitudes and Actions of Parents Choosing Day Care, 15 CHILD CARE Q. 159, 167 (1986); Katherine
Kensinger Rose & James Elicker, Parental Decision Making About Child Care, 29 J. FAM. ISSUES
1161, 1177 (2008); Anne B. Shlay, African American, White and Hispanic Child Care Preferences:
A Factorial Survey Analysis of Wei.fare Leavers by Race and Ethnicity, 39 Soc. SCI. RES. 125, 139
(2010).
3
See CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, at 51; NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS,
supra note 2, at 5 (quality was 40% of parents' biggest concern about child care); Ellen Kisker &
Rebecca Maynard, Quality. Cost, and Parental Choice of Child Care, in THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD

CARE 127, 136 (David M. Blau ed., 1991) ("Parents select their child care arrangements on the basis
of quality, location, and cost considerations, in that order."); MILLER, supra note 2, at 198; Jinseok
Kim & Maryah Stella Fram, Profiles ofChoice: Parents' Patterns of Priority in Child Care DecisionMaking, 24 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 77, 88 (2009) (greatest proportion of parents in the study
prioritized learning and quality); Vicki Peyton et al., Reasons for Choosing Child Care: Associations
with Family Factors, Quality, and Satisfaction, 16 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 191, 198 (200 l )(55 .9%
of mothers rated quality as the most important factor in selecting care); Helen Raikes et al., Parent

Experiences with State Child Care Subsidy Systems and Their Perceptions of Choice and Quality in
Care Selected, 23 EARLY EDUC. & DEV. 558, 576 (2012) [hereinafter Parent Experiences]. Of course,
the preference for quality varies according to a variety of demographic differences, including race,
education, class, ethnicity, and sex. See Leigh A. Leslie, Richard Ettenson & Patricio Cumsille,
Selecting a Child Care Center: What Really Matters to Parents?, 29 CHILD & YOUTH CARE F. 299,
303-04 (2000); Rose & Elicker, supra note 2, at 1177-80.
4

See BROWNE MILLER, supra note 2, at 199-201; Debby Cryer & Margaret Burchinal, Parents as
Child Care Consumers, 12 EARLY CHILDHOOD RES. Q. 35, 54 (1997) (parents overestimate quality
and are unaware they are not obtaining high quality); Parent Experiences, supra note 3, at 577 (73.6%
of parents rated the overall quality of the childcare arraignment as either "excellent" or "perfect");
Cryer, et al., supra note 2, at 269, 273 (strong tendency of parents to give high quality scores to
children's preschool classrooms); LOUIS MANFRA ET AL., PARENT PERCEPTIONS ABOUT CHILDCARE
QUALITY 15-16, dss.mo.gov/cbec/pdf/parent-perception-report.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2015)
(parents generous with grades and ranking of childcare providers); Helen Raikes et al., Parent
Perceptions of Child Care Choice and Quality in Four States, PUBLICATIONS CTR. ON CHILD.,
FAMILIES AND L. 4 (Oct, 31, 2005), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ccflpubs/14 (most parents in study
rated provider quality highly) [hereinafter Parent Perceptions].
5

See ELIZABETH PALLEY & COREY S. SHDAIMAH, IN OUR HANDS: THE STRUGGLE FOR U.S. CHILD
CARE POLICY 131 (2014); The NJCHD Study of Early Child Care and Youth Development: Findings
for Children Up to Age 4 0 Years, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
9-11 (2006), http://psycnet.apa.org.proxy.lib.uiowa.edu/joumals/amp/61/2/99.pdf& product Code=pa
[hereinafter NICHD]; EDWARD ZIGLER ET AL., THE TRAGEDY OF CHILD CARE IN AMERICA 10 (2009).
See also AJA y CHAUDRY, JULIA HENL y & MARCIA MEYERS, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CHILD
CARE DECISION-MAKING I (20 I 0), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/conceptual_
frameworks.pdf. Indeed, a recent study by the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development reports that "most child care settings in the United States provide care that is 'fair'
(between 'poor' and 'good')." NICHD, supra, at 11. Similarly, Professor Edward F. Zigler, founder
of the Edward Zigler Center in Child Development and Social Policy at the Yale School of Medicine,
wrote in 2009: "the quality of child care in America remains woefully inadequate, averaging
somewhere between poor and mediocre." ZIGLER ET AL., supra, at 10.
6

ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at ix.
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and the "most serious problem for children in our society." 7 Notwithstanding
parental preferences for high childcare quality, relatively few children are
receiving it. 8
How do we explain the disconnect? Perhaps the most pressing explanation is
that many parents lack the resources to purchase quality childcare for their
children. 9 And, as I have argued elsewhere, another explanation is classic market
failure. 10 The childcare market is imperfect. Within this market, parental demand
for quality is lower than optimal because of positive externalities and information
problems. 11 But the answer is undoubtedly even more complex. Childcare
decisions are deeply personal and involve some of our strongest affective ties.
They often reflect an uneasy combination of emotion, pragmatism, and
economics. And they are exercised in a market characterized by complexity,
ambiguity, and diversity of options. These features of childcare decision-making
create the conditions for error, sometimes based on completely irrelevant factors
like the timing, framing, or number of options presented. In short, childcare
decisions may not be perfectly rational-at least not in an economic sense.
This Article argues that behavioral market failure helps explain the
dysfunction in our childcare market. Over the last several decades, behavioral
economists have mined judgment and decision-making literature for insights into
how people actually form judgments and make decisions, establishing that a broad
array of mental shortcuts and cognitive biases impact them. 12 Behavioral law and
economics scholars have translated these lessons into law reform proposals in a
wide range of settings. 13 But although childcare is one of the United States' most
complex, important, and opaque markets, to date no one has used the discipline's
insights to argue in depth for reforms to childcare law and policy. 14

7

See Meredith Johnson, Childcare Market
Harbach, Childcare Market Failure].

8 Id. at
9

Failure, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 659, 669-72 [hereinafter

670-71.

Id. at 672.

10

See infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.

11

Harbach,

Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 679-8.7.

12

For some of the more recent explorations of this research, see, e.g., DAN ARlELY, THE UPSIDE OF
IRRATIONAL!TY (2011); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE
OUR DECISIONS (2010); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
13
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013); OREN BAR-GILL,
SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, & PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012);

RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEAL TH,
WEAL TH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) [hereinafter NUDGE).
14
See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 10. But see id. at 9-17; Janneke Plantenga, local Providers
and loyal Parents: Competition and Consumer Choice in the Dutch Childcare, in CHILDCARE
MARKETS: CAN THEY DELIVER AN EQUITABLE SERVICE? 63, 70-72 (Eva Lloyd & Helen Penn eds.,
2012).
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This project fills that gap by arguing that behavioral economics helps to
explain the discrepancies among what parents want from childcare, what they
demand, and what their children ultimately receive. This diagnosis not only helps
to explain the market's dysfunction, but also enables us to think creatively about
solutions. Law- and policymakers can reform childcare law and policy to account
for imperfect rationality in childcare decision-making. Borrowing a tag from
others in behavioral law and economics, 15 I call this approach "nudging parents."
Rather than overriding parental prerogatives, policymakers can identify, and in
some cases capitalize on, parents' behavioral anomalies to enhance childcare
judgments and decisions. Thus, just as behavioral market failure is this Article's
partial diagnosis of our childcare problem, nudging parents is its prescription.
Part I provides an overview of childcare quality and our childcare market,
first explaining the features and implications of childcare quality, and then
exploring the current state of the market and its failings. Part I ends by explaining
that the standard neoclassic diagnosis of market failure cannot fully account for
the paradox of childcare preferences versus childcare realities. Part II complicates
the traditional market failure model by explaining how the childcare market
manifests aspects of behavioral market failure, and examines how a variety of
heuristics and biases implicate childcare decision-making. Part III makes the case
for nudging parents toward more authentic childcare choices, even in the face of
concerns about state intrusion into such quintessentially private matters as the care
of children. Carefully designed nudges can help empower parents to make more
accurate childcare decisions for their children and their families, without
overriding parental choice.
The drivers of dysfunction in our childcare market are complex and
multifaceted. Although no single program or set of policies can alone resolve the
problems that beset American childcare, 16 behavioral economics offers powerful
methods to reshape and improve many areas oflaw and regulation. Incorporating
those lessons in this context offers one promising avenue to enhance childcare
decision-making and to develop a complementary, integrated approach to
childcare law and policy.
I: THE CHILDCARE MARKET: A STUDY IN FAILURE

In this Part, I set the stage for the contributions of behavioral economics by
reviewing conventional economic analysis of the childcare market, and the law's
interaction with it. I begin with a brief description of childcare quality and its
significance. I then set out the standard microeconomic diagnosis of our childcare
market's problems: market failure. Finally, I explain why conventional market
15
16

See NUDGE, supra note 13.

Cf ROBERTA WEBER, OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH & EVALUATION, ADM IN. FOR CHILDREN &
FAMILIES, UNDERSTANDING PARENTS' CHILD CARE DECISION-MAKING: A FOUNDATION FOR POLICY
MAKING 7 (2011 ), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/parents_childcare.pdf.

78

The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice

[19:2016]

failure is an incomplete explanation for the problems at work in the childcare
market.

A. The Significance of Quality
Decades of research have established a connection between childcare quality
and child outcomes. Before proceeding to my analysis of the childcare market, I
pause briefly to explain what quality childcare is, how it's measured, and what
difference it makes.
For experts, the definition of quality is straightforward: Quality childcare
should, at a minimum, meet children's social, cognitive, physical, and emotional
needs. 17 "Developmental" childcare is characterized as providing "safe and
healthful care, developmentally appropriate stimulation, positive interactions with
adults, encouragement of the child's individual emotional growth, and promotion
of positive relationships with other children." 18
There are two separate measures of quality in the child development
literature: process quality and structural quality. 19 Process quality looks to the
dynamics of children's interactions with their caregivers and with other children
in their childcare environments. 20 Structural quality refers to the specific features
of a particular childcare environment, child-staff ratio, group size, teacher
education and training, safety, staffing issues, program administration, and the
like. 21
Child development research indicates that the dynamic process quality of care
is most determinative of child outcomes. 22 But process quality is difficult to
measure. Structural features of care are more accessible barometers. 23
Accordingly, a standard measure of childcare quality is whether it meets the types
of structural standards established by accreditation organizations or by state
licensing authorities. 24
17

ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 67.

18

Id. Dr. Edward Zigler and his colleagues view developmental care as a "pragmatic compromise"
between custodial care that does nothing more than keep children safe while parents work, and
comprehensive care, which works with children and parents to provide for a range of children's needs
beyond standard care.
19

DAVID M. BLAU, THE CHILD CARE PROBLEM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 126 (2001) [hereinafter
CHILD CARE PROBLEM]; CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, at 39-40.

°

2

CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 125-26; CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2,
at 39-40.
21

CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 126; CLARKE-STEWART & ALLHUSEN, supra note 2, at
39-40.
22

See Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 670 n.67.

23

CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 126-27.

24

Id. at 126.
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Beyond expert consensus, "childcare" can mean different things to different
people, and that figures into notions of quality, too. 25 For some, childcare is little
more than what child development expert Edward Zigler characterizes as a
"container"-a place where children go while their parents work. 26 Others
understand childcare as any group setting 'that provides paid caregiving. 27 Or
childcare might be understood as care provided by anyone other than a parent. 28
Childcare also serves a variety of family needs, including parental work support,
child safety, child development, and school readiness. 29 Perhaps not surprisingly,
then, parents' definitions of childcare "quality" can vary, as do their childcare
needs and goals. 30
Despite this heterogeneity, overall parental 31 preferences and priontles
regarding childcare are remarkably consistent: They place a high value on quality
of care. 32 In a multitude of studies, parents rank safety, caregiver warmth, and
educational development as the most important features of childcare. 33 Though
parents might not be familiar with the child development literature, they care
about both process quality features like the emotional tone of the setting and the

25

MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 37.

26

ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at xi, I.

27

Id. at I.

2s Id.
29

WEBER, supra note 16, at 7.

JO

NICOLE FORRY ET AL., OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH & EVALUATION, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN
FAMILIES, CHILD CARE DECISION-MAKING LITERATURE REVIEW 5, 15 (2013),

&

http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/child_care_decision_makin~_literature_review_pdf_

version_v2.pdf; Parent Perceptions, supra note 4, at 3. Parents' preferences for childcare are dynamic,
and may be affected by the available options. See WEBER, supra note 16, at 5.
31

Although I characterize these preferences, judgments, and decisions as "parental," l do not intend
to gloss over the reality that women remain primarily responsible for caring for, and procuring care
for, children in the United States. Outsourced care generally is assumed to be essential to enable
mothers, not fathers, to pursue paid employment. Mothers, and women more generally, continue to
play the dominant role in childcare and childcare decisions. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY SUMMARY (2015),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nrO.htm (women spent more than twice as much time providing
physical care to children than men); Brigid Schulte, Mothers More Fatigued than Dads but Still Find
Jobs and Child Care Meaning/it/, Report Finds, WASH. POST (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
nati ona I/mothers-more-fatigued-than-dads-but-find-jobs-and-chi Id-care-meaningful-report-finds/20 I
3/10/08/37284b2c-2fc4-l I e3-9ccc-2252bdb 14df5_story.html (American Time Use Survey shows that
mothers spend about twice as much time as fathers on childcare and housework); NAT'L ASS'N OF
CHILD CARE RES. & REFERRAL AGENCIES, WHAT DO PARENTS THINK ABOUT CHILD CARE?:
FINDINGS FROM A SERIES OF Focus GROUPS 3 (2008) [hereinafter, NACCRRA, WHAT DO PARENTS
THINK?]. In an ideal world, of course, childcare decisions, like many other relating to the family,
would reflect a more gender-equitable distribution of time and effort.
32

33

FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 15.

WEBER, supra note 16, at 5; ZIGLER ET AL., supra note 5, at 5, 15-16; NACCRRA, PARENTS'
PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 5.
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caregiver-child relationship, and as structural features such as provider education,
training, and adult-child ratios. 34 Overall, parents' preferences for quality care
largely dovetail with child development priorities. 35
Childcare quality is tremendously consequential. After family, childcare
represents the most important developmental context for many American
children. 36 Burgeoning child development literature confirms that childcare
quality significantly affects child development, and higher quality care leads to
improved cognitive and social development for children. 37 Children who receive
high quality childcare fare better than those who don't in a multitude of contexts:
the need for remedial education, 38 high school graduation, 39 commission of

34 Forry et al., supra note 30, at 5, 15. See generally NACCRRA, Parents' Perceptions, supra note 2,
at 6-7; ArthurC. Emlen, et al., A Packet of Scales for Measuring Quality of Child Care From a Parent's
Point of View With Summary of Method and Findings 22 (2000).
35

NACCRRA, Parents' Perceptions, supra note 2, at 5; see, e.g., Cryer et al., supra note 2, at 273.

36

Zigler et al., supra note 5, at 1-2. But as Laura Rosenbury has compellingly demonstrated, home
and school are far from the only places in which children are socialized. See Laura A. Rosenbury,
Between Home and School, 155 U Pa. L. Rev. 833, 840-46 (2007).
37 See Blau, supra note 19, at 129-30; Child Care Aware of Am., Parents and the High Cost of
Childcare 9-10 (2014), http://cca.worksmartsuite.com/UserContentStart.aspx?category=27 (hereinafter
Parents]; J. Lee Kreader et al., Nat'! Center for Children in Poverty, Research-to-Policy Connections
No. 2, Infant and Toddler Child Care Quality 2 (2005); Deborah Lowe Vandell & Barbara Wolfe, Inst.
for Research on Poverty, Child Care Quality: Does It Matter and Does It Need to be Improved? 99100 (2000); NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, Child-Care Effect Sizes for the NICHD
Study ofEarly Child Care and Youth Development, 61 Am. Psychologist 99, I 13 (2006) [hereinafter
Child-Care Effect Sizes]. See also Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 680-82.
38

See generally James J. Heckman, Schools, Skills. and Synapses 90 (Nat' I Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14064, 2008) (15% of participants enrolled in special education, compared to 34%
of control group).
39

See generally id. (66% of Perry Preschool (PPS) participants graduated from high school on time,
versus 45% of control group); Frances A. Campbell et al., Adult Outcomes as a Function of an Early
Childhood Educational Program: An Abecedarian Project Follow-Up, 48 DEV. PSYCHOL. l 033, I 038
(2012) (showing 83% of participants graduated as opposed to 72% of nonparticipants, and were also
more likely to graduate from college).
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crime, 40 abuse and neglect, 41 unemployment,
parenthood, 44 and overall health. 45

81

42

public assistance,

43

teen

Given parental preferences for high quality care and the significance of that
quality for child development, we might expect a high level of quality care in the
childcare market. Yet the childcare crisis persists. 46 The question becomes why,
and what to do about it.
B. (Neo)Classic Childcare Market Failure
Because childcare is a market service for many families, it makes sense to
begin an analysis of its performance with microeconomics. Although childcare
has been infrequently discussed as a market phenomenon in the legal literature,
economists and social scientists have recognized and examined childcare as a
market service. 47 These scholars have determined that America's childcare
market manifests multiple aspects of classic market failure. 48

40

See generally Heckman, supra note 38, at 90 (PPS participants had significantly fewer arrests and
fewer months incarceration); David R. Katner, Delinquency and Daycare, 4 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
49, 57-58 (2010). Further, an intensive program directed at low-income, primarily African-American
families at Syracuse University decreased the overall incidence, severity, and recurrence of later
involvement with the juvenile justice system. Katner, supra, at 58.
41
See generally Katner, supra note 40, at 56--57 (discussing how neglect and abuse can adversely
affect development); COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF INVESTING IN HIGHQUALITY PRESCHOOL: USING EARLY EDUCATION TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE FISCAL
SUSTAINABILITY OF STATES AND THE NATION 22 (2006), https://www.ced.org/pdf/EconomicPromise-of-Investing-in-High-Quality-Preschool.pdf [hereinafter CED] (explaining PPS participants
were less likely to be unemployed).
42
See generally CED, supra note 41, at 22 (explaining PPS participants were more likely to be
employed at 40 and had higher incomes); LAWRENCE J. SCHWEINHART ET AL., THE HIGH/SCOPE
PERRY PRESCHOOL STUDY THROUGH AGE 40: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 2 (2005). The PPS students also performed better on other indicators of economic stability
like home ownership, savings, and financial independence. See CED, supra note 41, at 22; see
generally Heckman, supra note 38, at 90 (showing economic effects, including monthly income);
SCHWEINHART ET AL., supra, at 2.

43

Heckman, supra note 38, at 90.

44

See generally CED, supra note 41, at 22 (explaining that CAP participants are less likely to become
teenage parents).
45

See generally CED, supra note 41, at 22 (explaining that PPS participants at 40 are less likely to use
prescription and illegal drugs and less likely to have stopped work because of health issues). These
"health gains are associated with improved access to screening, immunization, and nutrition through
preschool." THE PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE
EDUCATION 212 (Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin eds., 2007).
46
See supra text accompanying notes 5-7; see also Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7,
at 669-72.
47

Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 678-85.

48

Id. at 678-85.
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Neoclassical economics deems markets inefficient (and therefore exhibiting
market failure) when they produce less of a good or service than would be socially
optimal. 49 The standard microeconomic diagnosis of problems in our childcare
market is market failure in the form of suboptimal demand for quality. so
Economists and social scientists have determined that two phenomena are causing
low demand: externalities and information problems. 51
First, quality childcare generates positive externalities. 52 Externalities occur
when some costs or benefits of market transactions are not fully reflected in the
transactions themselves, and are instead externalized to others. 53 As I explained
above, children and their families certainly reap the rewards of high quality
childcare. But they aren't the only ones. The benefits of high quality care spill
over to society more broadly-to classmates, neighbors, partners, future children,
colleagues, employers, and the taxpaying public. 54 Human capital research
demonstrates the economic spillovers of childcare are abundant. 55 In the short
term, society enjoys increased economic productivity from parental employment,
a more profitable workforce, and increased economic activity in the childcare
market. 56 In the longer term, we enjoy a more sophisticated future workforce and
an augmented tax base. 57 We also save money on interventions in education,
crime prevention, and public support services." 58 Because individual families
don't themselves enjoy all of these broader benefits, they may be unwilling to pay
a price commensurate with the overall value of childcare, and won't demand as
much quality as would be socially optimal. 59 Market failure occurs because the
individual transactions of families purchasing childcare don't reflect these broader
social spillovers.
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See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE ECONOMICS
OF EARLY CHILDHOOD INVESTMENTS 9-10 (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/early_childhood_reportl.pdf; LOWE VANDELL & WOLFE, supra note 37, at 81; DIANE
PAULSELL, MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR INVESTING IN
CHILDREN: A Focus ON CHILD CARE 6, 89-90 (2001), http://www.mathematicampr.com/-/media/publications/PDFs/econrationale.pdf. For a more extensive discussion of the
spillover problem in the childcare market, see Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at
678-84.
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Second, information imperfections also contribute to childcare market
failure. Multiple studies confirm that childcare consumers lack important
information about childcare. 60 Parents may have a fair conception of what
childcare quality is in the abstract, but know little about what is actually required
for high quality childcare. 61 They may assume that childcare providers are
monitored for basic health, safety, and training, though in reality many are not. 62
They may also have little information about the actual quality of providers in their
communities. 63 They lack information about the location and availability of
childcare, its relative costs, the features and characteristics of particular providers,
and the range of childcare alternatives. 64 And because outsourced childcare is not
readily observed, parents also lack information as to whether the care they select
in fact provides quality care to their children. 65 These information gaps frustrate
families' attempts to secure the childcare they prefer. 66 When parents lack
important information about quality, they may be unwilling to pay a premium for
it. 67 Thus, information problems also drive down demand for high quality care.
If classic market failure is the problem, state intervention is part of the
remedy. In fact, much contemporary regulation of economic activity is geared
toward mitigating market failure. 68 Although the law interacts with the childcare
market via subsidies, regulation, and the provision of information, existing law
and policy have been poorly calibrated to correct for market failure. 69 The federal
government and the states both provide subsidies for the purchase of childcare,
primarily through the Child Care and Development Fund (a supplement to the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program), tax benefits, and some direct
provision of services. 70 Except for direct provision, however, these subsidies have
been aimed primarily at facilitating parental employment and do not condition

60

Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 685.

61

See Cryer et al., supra note 2, at 275.

62

NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 6.
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CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at I.
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note 5, at 8.
65

See CHILD CARE PROBLEM, supra note 19, at 9; Cryer et al., supra note 2, at 274.
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DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-28 (2d ed.
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receipt on any particular level of quality. 71 The existing licensing and oversight
framework in the United States is limited and uneven, with low standards, narrow
applicability, and infrequent monitoring. 72 Finally, the information states provide
on childcare quality and location is fractured and incomplete. 73
A more robust state response to the externalities and information problems in
the childcare market would represent a significant step toward enhancing the
market's functioning. Elsewhere I have argued for enhanced subsidies, regulation,
and information to counteract the failures in our childcare market. 74 Subsidy
funding should be increased and tied to quality. 75 Regulation should be more
expansive, apply to more providers, and be more vigorously enforced. 76 And
states should provide more comprehensive information about the indicia and
availability of childcare quality, through direct provision of information,
screening of providers, and supporting private accreditation efforts that signal
childcare quality. 77 These steps would not only lead to a healthier childcare
market in practical terms, but would also prompt us to revisit and reinterpret the
state's normative role vis-a-vis American childcare. 78
By focusing our attention on spillovers and information problems,
conventional market failure theory has much to offer in the way of shoring up our
childcare market. The market failure lens brings the potential for new perspectives
and innovative legal solutions to the childcare market. As it turns out, however,
there is more to the childcare quality paradox than externalities and information
deficits.

71

Id.
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Id. at 700-703.
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C. Beyond Classic Market Failure

Despite its insights and contributions, conventional economic analysis alone
cannot solve our childcare market problems altogether. Here, [consider the limits
of classic market failure theory.
In this context, the model has at least two limitations. The first is the model's
inattention to distributional issues and resource constraints: Many parents and
families simply don't have the means to purchase the quality of care they desire. 79
High quality childcare is expensive and for some families, prohibitively so. It
tends to be one of the highest budgeting items for working families, and is largely
beyond the reach of low-income families. 80 Thus, although standard economic
theory tends to be agnostic as to baseline distributions of resources, 81
distributional inequality in our childcare market is a central concern. But the
resource question requires additional analysis and prescriptions. 82 And while
resource constraints certainly interact with the market failures I discuss above and
below, they are not my primary focus of inquiry here. 83
79
PARENTS, supra note 37, at 20-25; NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 5 (staying
at home to care for children not an option because of financial concerns); NACCRRA, WHAT DO
PARENTS THINK?, supra note 31, at 14, 18-19 (parents had difficulty finding level of quality desired
that they could afford and was available during needed hours) (high price is main driver of parental
compromise on childcare choices).

80

NAT'L ASS'N OF CHILD CARE RES. & REFERRAL AGENCIES, PARENTS AND THE HIGH COST OF
CHILDCARE: 2015 REPORT 22-36 (2015), http://www.usa.childcareaware.org/advocacy-publicpolicy/resources/reports-and-research/costofcare/.
81

See Harbach, Chi/dare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 676-77, fu.108.

82

Indeed, our failure as a society to adequately invest in and ensure quality care for all of America's
children is both a moral failing and its own type of behavioral failure, writ large. As a country, we are
shortsighted, far too focused on initial outlays and costs for childcare, and thus make decisions that
don't reflect our longer-term goals for children, families, and society. By investing too little in the
short term, we collectively fall prey to present bias in ways that have significant consequences for our
future. See infra text accompanying notes 215-225 (discussing present bias in more depth).
83

I bracket the distribution question here, not because it is unworthy of sustained consideration, but
because a more in depth discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. Resource inequality is an
important component of my broader childcare market project. Although parents' chief concerns
regarding childcare are safety and child development, too many of them struggle to afford it.
NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at I; CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 5, 30;
MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 26, 31 (noting low-income parents may choose lower quality because
it is affordable and geographically accessible). Most feel that both parents must work in today's
economy and that childcare is therefore a necessity. Id. In a recent survey, three-quarters of parents
agreed that making affordable childcare available is the most important way to help working families.
NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at I. In addition, data on childcare availability
indicates that pockets of"childcare deserts" exist throughout the country, especially for infants, special
needs children, and nontraditional hours. See MANFRA ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 7. More broadly, many
contemporary American families are in transition or crisis in ways that make it more difficult for
families to, in the words of Clare Huntington, flourish. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO
FLOURISH: How LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 27-54 (2014). Many of these changes
are associated with resources and family income. See JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE
MARKETS: How INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY 83 (2014).
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Instead, my focus in this project is on a second limitation: the ways in which
rational choice theory oversimplifies market judgments and decision-making.
Neoclassical economic theory uses economic modeling to predict and explain
market behavior, and provides models for enhancing efficiency. 84 The starting
point for neoclassical theory is the rational preference-maximizer (homo
economicus) who exercises rational judgment and decision-making to maximize
benefits. 85 But this prototype is necessarily abstract - less complex and varied
than the realities of market (or other) behavior in the real world. 86
Thus, in the context of childcare, standard economic modeling would assume
that parents armed with sufficient means, information, and proper incentives
would act with perfect rationality and self-control to pursue their preferences for
higher-quality childcare. 87 And in the absence of market failure, the childcare
market should operate efficiently and reflect parents' demand for high-quality
care. But as I explore below, data on childcare judgment and decision-making
demonstrates that while this may be consistent with market theory, it emphatically
does not represent reality.
The childcare decision-making process is complex rather than lineardynamic and multidimensional. 88 Childcare decisions are multi-party decisions,
reflecting attempts to optimize outcomes for parents, children, and families as a
whole. 89 Most parents "choose" 90 childcare, in part, to facilitate their own
employment. 91 Many also elect to use childcare for child development purposes. 92
More broadly, parents outsource childcare as part of larger family management
84

COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 1; Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 67778.
85

COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 72; Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives:
Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1218
(2003).
86

KLAUS MATHIS & DEBORAH SHANNON, EFFICIENCY INSTEAD OF JUSTICE?: SEARCHING FOR THE
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7, 14 (2009).
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CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 6--9.
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Id. at 1-2; WEBER, supra note 16, at 3.
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See WEBER, supra note 16, at 3. See generally CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 8 n.3, 21-22.
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I place choose in quotations because for many parents, using childcare is much more an imperative
than choice. For many, working outside the home isn't optional, and childcare is, thus, essential. See
Meredith Johnson Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 254, 263-68 (2012)
[hereinafter Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare]. Reflecting the complexity and constraints of childcare
decision-making, Marcia Meyers and Lucy Jordan argue that these decisions are better understood as
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decisions, benefitting all family members and enhancing overall family
functioning. 93 Parents may be imperfect agents for their children because the
needs of these three "decision targets," 94 (parent, child, and family) may vary and
sometimes even conflict. These decisions are also constrained by time, work
schedules, availability, accessibility, and-significantly-financial resources and
cost. 95 In the end, the childcare selected may not be ideal for the child(ren),
parent(s), or the larger family, but may nevertheless be selected because it was
perceived to be the best of available options, given the opportunities, constraints,
and barriers. 96
In the face of this complexity, parents' childcare decisions often are
paradoxical. 97 Studies document discrepancies between parental preferences
concerning childcare quality on the one hand, and their process for choosing
childcare and ultimate choices on the other. 98 One recent survey on parental
perceptions of childcare characterizes these decisions as a "gut check" for many
parents. 99 Despite their stated preferences, the childcare search for most parents
"tends to be limited, informal, and unlikely to involve systematic data-gathering
and assessment of pertinent information." 100 In another recent focus group, few
parents checked to determine whether their childcare was licensed, had
infractions, or had been recently inspected. 101
Yet there is a strong tendency by parents to rate their children's care
highly 102 -significantly higher than trained, external observers rate the same
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See Harbach, Outsourcing Childcare, supra note 90, at 263-68; WEBER, supra note 16, at 3-5.
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In the psychology literature, a "decision target" is the person for whom a decision is made. Jingyi
Lu et al., Desirability or Feasibility: Se/f-Other Decision-Making Differences, 39 PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 144, 145 (2012).
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NACCRRA, PARENTS' PERCEPTIONS, supra note 2, at 8.

100
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Lynn Kagan, one of the lead authors of the Cost, Quality and Outcomes study, notes that parents spend
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care. 103 Some individuals rate childcare quality as high even in the face of
indications to the contrary. 104 In the same focus group study, for example, parents
rated the quality of their own childcare almost twice as highly as experts had
determined was in fact available within their communities. 105
What's more, despite perceptions and preferences for high quality care,
relatively few report they would be willing to pay more for the care their children
are receiving. 106 Some families appear to respond to price effects and the
availability of financial resources by increasing their demand for the quantity of
childcare, but not increased quality. IO? In other words, families who might have
the means to purchase higher quality care or pay more aren't always doing so. Ios
How do we make sense of these anomalies? By challenging standard
economic assumptions about rationality and willpower, behavioral economics
suggests the realities of childcare judgment and decision-making are more
complex than conventional economics might assume, and that behavioral market
failure is also at work. My discussion turns to these insights next.
II. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS & THE CHILDCARE MARKET

Behavioral economics supplements traditional economic theory with more
accurate models of socioeconomic behavior. I09 Behavioral law and economics is
credited with bringing a more realistic assessment of human decision-making to
neoclassical law and economics analysis, and more practical prescriptions for law
and policy initiatives. 110 In this Part, I survey the literature, explaining how
behavioral economics has refined certain aspects of neoclassical economics. I then
use a behaviorally-informed lens to examine how parents make childcare

'°3 Cryer, et al., supra note 2, at 271.
104

BROWNE MILLER, supra note 2, at 199-20 I.

ios NACCRRA, WHAT DO PARENTS THINK?, supra note 31, at 20.
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David Blau observes:
[A] decrease in the price of child care increases the quantity of child care
demanded and the employment rate of mothers, but does not increase the quality
of care demanded; an increase in the mother's wage rate increases the mother's
employment and the demand for center care and paid care, but does not increase
the quality of care demanded; and an increase in family income other than the
mother's earnings increases the quality of care demanded, but by a very small
amount.
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decisions, theorizing that behavioral market failure is at work. I conclude by
suggesting that given this behavioral market failure, parents would benefit from
"nudges" in the direction of their true preferences and priorities.
A. From Homo Economicus to Behavioral Economics
The most basic economic models for predicting market behavior rely on a
number of simplifying assumptions: perfect competition, perfect information, and
perfectly efficient markets that maximize social benefit and generate zero
waste. 111 Market failure results when market conditions and transactions diverge
from these idealized background assumptions. But the "invisible hand" of
perfectly functioning markets depends on more than perfect market conditions. It
also depends on perfect market actors.
Neoclassical economic theory models market behavior on homo economicus,
or "economic man," 112 who is assumed to be fully, perfectly rational. 113 Rational
choice theory relies on multiple assumptions about the psychology and decisionmaking capacity of homo economicus: 114 Homo economicus has well-formed
preferences that accurately reflect the costs and benefits of available options. 115
Homo economicus responds to incentives by accurately conducting a cost-benefit
analysis of competing options, and then selecting the option that maximizes
expected benefits and minimizes expected costs. 116 Homo economicus processes
information optimally, 117 and in cases of uncertainty has well-formed views on
how such uncertainty will resolve, accurately updating these views based on
probabilistic assessments. 118
But while standard neoclassical models of rationality may work as predictive
and explanatory tools in a number of contexts, 119 it's clear that these assumptions
aren't as a rule realistic descriptions of how economic actors make decisions in
the real world. As Professors Cole and Grossman put it: "People are not human

111

Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1218; Harbach, Childcare Market Failure, supra note 7, at 677.
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NUDGE, supra note 13, at 6; Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics 2
(Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7948, 2000), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w7948.pdf.
113
NUDGE, supra note 13, at 6; Camerer et al., supra note 85, at 1214-15; Russell 8. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. I 051, 1053 (2000); Mullainathan & Thaler, supra note 112, at 2.
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calculators, constantly processing every single bit of information they receive and
estimating the costs and benefits of the several thousand discrete decisions they
make every day." 120 Instead, homo economicus is a "heuristic fiction: ... a mere
assumption made for the purpose of analyzing economic problems." 121
In contrast to neoclassical economic theory, behavioral economics takes the
reality of human imperfection as the new background assumption. 122 Behavioral
economists have mined the judgment and decision-making literature from
cognitive psychology, uncovering data that complicates neoclassical assumptions
about rationality in market behavior. 123 The literature makes clear we are
imperfectly-rather than perfectly-rational. 124 Real people display boundedrather than perfect-rationality. 125 They also have bounded self-control. 126
Frequently, our preferences are ill-defined, and are constructed rather than simply
elicited by social situations. 127 We often fail to maximize our expected utility,
neglecting to make choices that are most consistent with our preferences and
goals. 128 Real people make systematic mispredictions about the costs and benefits
of particular choices. 129 Cognitive limitations constrain our ability to process
information optimally. 130 We fail to update information rationally in uncertain

°COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 68, at 81.
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situations. 131 In all these ways, real people frequently act in ways that deviate from
the predictions of rational choice theory for homo economicus. 132
Thus, behavioral economics establishes that rather than making flawless
decisions that accurately reflect our preferences and optimize our goals, we often
diverge from perfect rationality in systematic ways. 133 Building on these insights,
behavioral economics seeks to supplement traditional economic modeling and
predictions with more realistic and accurate assumptions about human behavior
gleaned from social science. 134 In other words, behavioral economics is
concerned with the ways in which humans differ from homo economicus. 135
Behavioral economics looks to cognitive psychology to help unpack the
mechanics of our imperfect rationality, examining the contexts in which these
missteps play out, why we are prone to make them, and how we commit them.
In what contexts do we deviate from perfect rationality? Behavioral
economics classifies bounded rationality into one of two basic categories:
judgment errors, and choices or decisions that deviate from expected utility. 136
Estimating the frequency, magnitude, and/or probability of uncertain events is a
central component of economic decision-making. 137 Judgment is the process by
which people estimate the likelihood of various outcomes, 138 thereby forming
beliefs about probability. 139 We then use judgments to value different outcomes
and ultimately make choices, or decisions. 14 Choice or decision-making is the
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process by which we value different outcomes and select from among various
paths, 141 taking into account any relevant judgments we may have formed. 142
When people make systematic judgment errors, poor choices are likely to result,
even if they have the information and incentives to make good ones. 143
Why do we deviate from perfect rationality? We have limited cognitive
capacities and live in a complicated world. 144 We often face judgments and
decisions fraught with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty. 145 As they become
more complex, acting according to our predicted utility requires increasing
cognitive effort. 146 Yet we are limited in our attention spans, calculation
capabilities, and memories. We are further limited in time, willpower, and
emotional capacity. 147 We are incapable of optimally processing information in
all contexts. 148
How do we deviate from perfect rationality? Our cognitive response to this
complexity is to develop simplifying strategies. We develop what we might think
of as a cognitive toolbox of shortcuts. 149 When confronted with a decision for
which judgment is required, people select a tool suited to that judgment. 150 In the
judgment and decision-making literature, these simplifying tools are known as
heuristics. 151 The etiology of the term derives from mathematics and computer
science, which distinguish between the complex and often inefficient algorithms
that guarantee accurate results, and heuristics, which are more efficient methods
of answering the same problems, but with greater likelihood of inaccuracy. 152
Heuristics are best understood as mental shortcuts or "rules ofthumb" 153-hard-

141

Id.

142

Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, at 9-10.

143

Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1166.
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Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at 2136; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1069 (arguing
bounded rationality stems from the high costs of processing information, limited cognition, or both).
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Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1076.
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See NUDGE, supra note 13, at 22; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at I 078; Rachlinski, Selling
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See NUDGE, supra note 13, at 7, 37; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1076; see also
KAHNEMAN, supra note 12, at 19-105 (expanding these insights by identifying two separate decisionmaking processes: System 1 (which is intuitive, emotional, and simplistic) and System 2 (which is
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wired processes that are virtually automatic and occur with little conscious
effort. 154 Some common examples include our ability to recognize a previously
experienced situation (the availability heuristic) and our ability to judge
similarities between situations (the representativeness heuristic). 155 Heuristics are
often useful and effective, providing fast, rough-and-ready approximations when
time and cognition are limited. 156 But like the mathematic processes on which
they are based, heuristics can also lead to systematic miscalculations. 157
At the same time, escalating complexity increases the potential for us to fall
prey to bias in our cognitive tasks, leading to inaccurate judgments and
decisions. 158 Biases are deviations from the normative predictions of utility
maximization. 159 And because they are systematic and predictable in certain
circumstances, behavioral economics have given them diagnostic labels. 160
Examples of cognitive bias include our tendency to believe our risk of a poor
outcome is lower than it actually is (optimism bias), our impatience for short-term
as opposed to long-term rewards (time inconsistency), our tendency to select the
status quo or default option (status quo bias), and our tendency to place a greater
negative value on losses than we place positive value on equivalent gains (loss
aversion). Relatedly, prospect theory predicts that when making decisions about
uncertain outcomes, we are more likely to evaluate those outcomes based on their
predicted departure from an initial reference point, rather than on the costs and
benefits of the outcomes themselves. 161 We are thus "biased" in favor of initial
reference points, which renders our ultimate decisions less accurate. Our
proclivity toward bias can color our judgments and muddle our decisions.
In sum, behavioral economics posits that because of our reliance on heuristics
and our vulnerability to bias, we will form judgments and make decisions in
imperfectly rational ways, exhibiting decision-making anomalies-patterns of
judgment and choice that are inconsistent with rational choice theory. This insight
broadens the universe of potential market failure considerably. As is the case
when market conditions diverge from standard assumptions, when human
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NUDGE, supra note 13, at 23; Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 114, at 11; Jolls, Sunstein, &
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behavior diverges from the assumptions of perfect rationality, the market operates
sub-optimally, 162 leading to a sort of behavioral market failure. 163 Similar to our
understanding of conventional market failure, behavioral market failure
represents a departure from market efficiency, but this time driven by the ways in
which assumptions about human behavior, rather than market conditions, prove
to be imprecise. 164
Once we recognize many of our judgments and decisions are imperfectly
rational, it becomes clear that market failure is far more pervasive than
conventional economic modeling would predict. 165 I now tum to examine the
operation of heuristics and biases in the childcare market, and offer a theory of
the behavioral market failure that results.
B. Theorizing Behavioral Failures in the Childcare Market
Behavioral economics provides insight into how and why people, including
parents, miscalculate in market and non-market settings. 166 Of course, to say that
parents are imperfect isn't news to anyone with children. For present purposes,
the important point is that in forming judgments and making decisions about
childcare, parents will likely be prone to the same types of departures from
rationality that others make in other contexts.
A central contribution of behavioral economics is to theoretically predict and
empirically confirm that people often experience a difference between their
"decision utility" and "experienced utility,"-that is to say, a difference between
the welfare they think they will reap from a particular decision, and the welfare
they actually receive after making this decision. 167 Given the disconnect between
the statistically high number of parents who rate childcare quality as a central
priority 168 and the overall low quality of care demanded in the market, it seems

162
See Brigitte C. Madrian, Applying Insights From Behavioral Economics to Policy Design, 6 ANN.
REV. ECON. 663, 664-65 (2014).
163
Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1832, 1842. Professor Sunstein has developed a helpful taxonomy of
behavioral market failures that act as adjuncts to the standard market failures of traditional economic
theory. Id. at 1842. In exercising judgment and making decisions, people are prone to commit four
basic types of mistakes: (I) we exhibit a bias toward present action and make short-term decisions that
are inconsistent with long-terms goals; (2) we overlook important information in making decisions;
(3) we exhibit unrealistic optimism regarding the possibility of poor outcomes; and (4) we have
difficulty assessing the probability of alternative outcomes. Id. at 1842-1852. But see Amir & Lobel,
supra note 127, at 2125 (explaining that many problems diagnosed in Nudge can be explained by
externalities and third-party effects).
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Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1484.
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likely that at least some parents' childcare judgments and decisions are not
maximizing their expected utility. 169 Although the empirical data on childcare
decision-making is still developing, 170 the information we do have suggests this
is the case. But before exploring these findings in detail, I first consider a unique
feature of childcare decision-making: the fact that there are multiple "decision
targets" for childcare choices.
1. Decisions for Self versus Others

As discussed above, childcare decisions are at once intended to benefit
children, parents, and the family as a whole. In other words, the decision targets
are multiple-parents are choosing not only for their children, but also for
themselves, and for their families overall. Thus, childcare decisions differ in
important ways from judgments and decisions individuals make only for
themselves.
Psychologists have only recently begun to study the differences between
decisions for self versus others, and the literature on "self-other" decision-making
and its implications for cognitive bias is nascent. 171 But scholars have established
that cognitive biases often operate differently when deciding for someone other
than oneself, 172 with some cognitive biases amplified 173 and others diminished. 174

169 See supra note 5. Other forces are also at work. Parents reports themselves may be inaccurate. For
example, their reported preferences may have already been altered to conform to social norms, or
parents may respond to hypothetical questions by incorporating assumptions that affect their reported
preferences. See Justine S. Hastings, Richard Van Weelden, & Jeffrey Weinstein, Preferences,
Information, and Parental Choice Behavior in Public School Choice 5 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 12995, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 2995.
170
Indeed, one of the implications of my work here is that childcare decision-making warrants
increased empirical study in the social sciences, so that we can best design law and policy initiatives
to enhance and support parental decision-making. See CHAUDRY, ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (outlining
potential areas of new research and synthesis of existing research on childcare decision-making);
FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 12 (describing how literature on childcare decision-making is
underdeveloped); id. at 31-32 (suggesting potential studies to consider the operation of heuristics and
biases in childcare decision-making).
171

Evan Pol man, Effects of Self-Other Decision Making on Regulatory Focus and Choice Overload,
102 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 980, 990 (2012) [hereinafter Polman, Regulatory Focus];
Evan Po Iman, lriformation Distortion in Self-Other Decision Making, 46 J. EXPERIMENT AL Soc.
PSYCHOL. 432, 435 (2010) [hereinafter Polman, Information Distortion].
172 Chung-Chau Chang et al., The Compromise Effect in Choosing for Others, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 109, 110--11 (2012); Lu et al., supra note 94, at 145; Polman, Information Distortion, supra
note 171, at 432; Peter A. Ube! et al., Physicians Recommend Different Treatments for Patients Than
They Would Choose for Themselves, 17 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 630, 630 (2011 ).
173
Polman, Regulatory Focus, supra note 171, at 980 (describing omission bias, confirmation bias,
lexicographic weighting, and predecisional distortion as greater when deciding for another; greater
risk aversion in some contexts).
174
Id. at 980 (describing the decreased risk aversion in some contexts); Evan Polman, Self-Other
Decision Making And Loss Aversion 119 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 141, 143, 148
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Still other biases may be more or less prevalent depending on context. 175 The
variability of cognitive biases in self-other decision-making isn't yet fully
understood. 176 What is more, the operation of self-other decision-making likely
differs depending on whom the decision target is, and how psychologically
proximate or distant that target is from the decider. 177 Parents are psychologically
close to their children, but no research has systematically examined how parents'
decisions for their children differ from decisions for themselves. 178 And of special
interest here, childcare decisions are made both for parents themselves and for
others (their children and families).
A full exploration of the implications of self-other decision-making is beyond
the scope of this Article, and would be premature given the still-evolving research.
For the purposes of this project, the important point is that despite these variances,
research on childcare decision-making suggests that parents are, indeed,
vulnerable to heuristics and biases, and exhibit them in childcare judgments and
decisions. Having flagged the issue of self-other decision-making, I now tum to
explore prominent heuristics and biases that likely interact with childcare
judgments and decisions, and theorize how they might lead to behavioral market
failure in the childcare market.
2.

Childcare Quality Judgments

Before making childcare decisions, parents and families form judgments
about the likelihood that particular providers will supply quality childcare. This
isn't unusual; people frequently are called upon to form judgments based on the
likelihood that one or another eventuality will come to pass. 179 But when
heuristics and biases interact with judgment tasks, people sometimes make too of

(2012) [hereinafter Polman, Loss Aversion] (describing decreased omissions bias and reduced loss
aversion, respectively).
175

Chang et al., supra note 172, at 110; Polman, Regulatory Focus, supra note 171, at 980 (noting the
level of risk aversion in choosing for others varies by context); Polman, Information Distortion, supra
note 171, at 432.
176

Polman, Loss Aversion, supra note 174, at 148; Polman, Regulatory Focus, supra note 171, at 980.

177

Chang et al., supra note 172, at 111; Christopher K. Hsee & Elke U. Weber, A Fundamental
Prediction Error: Se/j:Others Discrepancies in Risk Preference, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 45,
52 (1997); Lu et al., supra note 94, at 145; Polman, Regulatory Focus, supra note 171, at 990; Fenja
V. Ziegler & Richard J. Tunney, Decisions/or Others Become Less Impulsive the Further Away They
Are on the Family Tree, 7 PLOS ONE 1, 2, 4 (2012) (describing the relationship between decisionmaker and decision target can affect optimality of decisions).
178
Rebecca A. Dore et al., A Social Values Analysis of Parental Decision Making, 148 J. PSYCHOL.:
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND APPLIED 477, 478 (2014).
179
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1085. "To accurately predict the probability of future events,
actors must consider the statistical probability that an event will occur and 'update' (adjust) this 'base
rate' with any available particularized information about a specific situation." Id.

Nudging Parents

97

much certain information while overlooking or ignoring other important data. 180
This distorts judgments of likelihood and probability and can dramatically slant
people's appreciation of risk. 181 Here, I survey several of the most common
heuristics and biases, and consider their potential impact on childcare quality
judgments.

a. Availability and Representativeness
The availability heuristic affects how easily certain events come to mind. 182
Relying on availability, we access information that is easily recalled, forming a
judgment of likelihood based on salience. 183 People tend to access and use
information that is recent, well-known, and vivid. 184 Thus, we base our
assessments of frequency or likelihood on the ease with which we can retrieve
examples from memory. 185 When it goes awry, this heuristic can lead us to
overestimate the frequency or likelihood of the most vivid events while
underestimating others. 186
The representativeness heuristic works similarly. Using this rule of thumb,
people make judgments of frequency or likelihood based on observed similarities
between the subject of judgment and a reference or target category. 187 In lockstep
with availability, the representativeness heuristic may cause people to
overestimate the likelihood that something actually is what it appears to be. 188
As a result of these two heuristics, data that is vivid, salient, common, or
familiar is more easily recalled and compared. 189 Excessive reliance on available
or representative data causes people to overlook or ignore other, less salient (but
important) information. 190 Rather than optimal processing of information,
availability and representativeness can lead to faulty estimations of likelihood,
resulting in inaccurate judgments about risk. 191 When market actors make
180

Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1846.

181

Id. at 1851.

182
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183
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185
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systematic miscalculations of risk, the market itself becomes distorted because it
does not reflect the true preferences of these actors. 192
When confronting childcare options, parents must make assessments about
the likelihood that their children will receive high quality care, low quality care,
or even experience harm. In predicting these eventualities, availability and
representativeness may come into play. For example, based on a highly publicized
event of harm at an institutional childcare center, parents might judge the risk of
harm to be higher at childcare centers, as opposed to, say, smaller, childcare home
environments. 193 In reality, studies show that on average, center-based care is
much more likely to be licensed, is safer, and is of higher quality than childcare
homes. 194
Parents may also make categorical judgments about quality based on
perceived similarities to a reference or target category. Relying on
representativeness, they may judge quality using other proxies like orderliness,
cleanliness, or resemblance to another provider known to be of high quality. 195
Some parents value providers who are "'parent-like"' and seem to '"love
children"' 196-providers who exhibit similar values and discipline styles. 197 Or
they might judge childcare homes to be of higher quality because they're more
"home-like,"-intimate, nurturing, and therefore of higher quality than larger,
institutional childcare centers. 198 In one recent survey, for example, parents
reported basing childcare decisions on their perceptions of the aspects of care they
could recognize easily through observation and conversations with the caregiver,
such as warmth and cleanliness. 199 Parents may use these features to gauge quality
rather than the more formal measures used by experts. 200 (Of course, cleanliness
and warmth can be consistent with higher-quality care, but their existence is no

192
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DELIVER AN EQUITABLE SERVICE? 131, 142 (Eva Lloyd & Helen Penn, eds., 2012);see also MANFRA
ET AL., supra note 4, at 8 (parents see foam ground covers beneath playground equipment and perceive
safety; experts see danger because the equipment has no mechanism for preventing falls);
NACCRRA, WHAT DO PARENTS THINK?, supra note 31, at 9 (clean and friendly heard repeatedly in
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guarantee.) Similarly, high demand may act as a proxy for quality. One study
found parents viewed providers with substantial waitlist to be of high quality. 201
At the other end of the spectrum, some parents underestimate quality simply
because of the neighborhood in which a childcare provider is situated, assuming
quality must be low. 202 Or parents might associate childcare centers with lower
quality because they are for profit, judging them to be "supermarket childcare,"
as opposed to non-profit and/or community linked providers. 203 And finally,
parents' judgments are further complicated because the measures of quality most
frequently relied upon by experts-structural quality-are themselves proxies for
the more predictive but elusive quality measure: process quality. 204

b. Overoptimism and Self serving Bias
People tend to make cognitive inferences that are self-serving. 205 Often, we
will interpret information or form judgments in ways that either confirm
preconceptions or otherwise serve our interests. 206 When subject to these biases,
we will respond more readily to desired, rather than unwanted, information. 207
This in turn distorts appreciation of risk and estimations of probability, leading us
to take unjustifiable risks. 208
Unrealistic optimism is one of the most recognized self-serving biases. Most
of us believe we're "above average," 209 less likely to suffer from poor choices or
bad outcomes than are others. 210 Yet, as Professors Korobkin and Ulen wryly
observe, "[n]otwithstanding Garrison Keillor's report, all the children in Lake
Wobegon cannot really be above average." 211 When people are overly optimistic,

201
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they underestimate risk and fail to take sufficient care to protect against poor
outcomes. 212 Thus, overoptimism is at the root of individual risk-taking,
particularly in the context of life and health. 213 Related to overoptimism is
overconfidence: we overestimate our ability to make accurate judgments. 214 This
can exacerbate the effects of our flawedjudgments. 215
These biases appear to impact judgments about childcare quality. There is a
tendency among parents to rate the care their children receive highly-much more
so than expert observers. 216 In one study of parents as childcare consumers, for
example, authors hypothesized something like overoptimism was at work:
It is possible that parents rate the quality of their children's
programs not according to their assessment of reality, but
according to their hopes and desires for their much loved
children. Not knowing the whole story about what actually
happens to their children in child care, since they are rarely
present to find out, parents might assume that the most
important things are really being provided for their children. 217

A later study found that in addition to overestimating their children's care,
parents assign higher quality scores to aspects of care they believe to be more
important. 218 Still another sociologist studying childcare surmised that
consumers' propensity to assess social services favorably may explain the
tendency of parents to judge childcare quality as high, despite indications to the
contrary. 219 These judgments tend to confirm parents' beliefs about quality and
serve their interests by reassuring themselves that their children are well cared for.
As a result of these bias, parents, like other consumers, may underestimate
the risk that a childcare provider might not provide quality care. 22 Consequently,
parents may pay insufficient attention to issues of quality and safety, opting for
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unlicensed or subpar care but reassuring themselves that nothing bad will happen
to their children.
In sum, the operation of heuristics and biases in childcare judgment creates
opportunities for parents to overlook important data and misjudge the quality of
providers. 221 And errors in judgment can prejudice their decision-making process.
3. Childcare Decisions
After forming judgments about the available quality from various providers,
parents must weigh their options and choose among them. As just discussed,
parents' use of heuristics may lead them to form inaccurate judgments about the
quality provided by particular caregivers. And as they begin the decision-making
process, additional interactions with heuristics and biases may further complicate
things. What's more, heuristics and biases not only impact initial decisions. from
among competing options, but also subsequent decisions that weigh whether to
make a change. Below, I consider these phenomena in the context of the childcare
market.
a.

Present Bias

People often make decisions that have consequences over time, requmng
them to compare short- and long-term costs and benefits. 222 Many important life
decisions-educational investments, labor supply, health and diet-exhibit this
characteristic. 223 According to the standard economic account, people should
make these decisions in ways that reflect their long-term preferences and goals. 224
Behavioral economics demonstrates that to the contrary, because of bias and
bounded self-control, people exhibit behavior that is "dynamically
inconsistent": 225 They sometimes make short-term decisions that are actually
inconsistent with their long-term goals. 226
When making decisions about investment goods like education, labor, health,
and diet, people tend to invest too little in the short term. 227 These problems are
especially acute when there exists the possibility of a small short-term gain at the
expense of longer-term losses. 228 People are biased toward present rewards, and
221

When availability, representativeness, and over-opttm1sm work in tandem, people may
underestimate risk significantly. NUDGE, supra note 13, at 31-32.
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discount the potential longer-term benefits of alternative choices. 229 A primary
driver of this time inconsistency is "hyperbolic discounting." 230 This bias leads
people to make shortsighted decisions in favor of immediate costs or benefits
rather than those that are more remote. 231
Problems of present bias and time inconsistency seem likely to be a partial
cause of the low demand for quality childcare. Many of childcare's short-term
benefits are related to affordability, convenience, and facilitating parental work
outside the home. By contrast, quality-related costs and benefits tend to be
cumulative and more apparent in the longer-term. 232 Because so many parents
desperately need childcare in order to work, market demand that privileges
availability and convenience over quality suggests present bias may be at work.
In the absence of such bias, and assuming adequate resources, some parents might
channel more financial resources toward investments in quality care. For yet
another cohort of parents, present bias is eclipsed by economic reality:
notwithstanding their preferences for higher quality care, their choices ultimately
are constrained by what they can afford.
b. Salience
Recall that one of the central insights of prospect theory is that, rather than
evaluating choices based on costs and benefits, we often evaluate them according
to their relationship to a fixed reference point. 233 In other words, choices are made
in context and through a process of comparison. 234 When making comparisons to
a reference point, a cognitive process similar to the availability heuristic plays out.
As with forming judgments, when making decisions, cognitive limitations prevent
people from fully accounting for all available information in making comparisons.
Instead, people direct their attention to what their minds focus on-what is most
salient. 235 People may respond more strongly to salient data and overlook less
prominent, but still important, data. 236 Consumers may thus place too much
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weight on the most salient attributes of a service, overlooking other important
features. 237
Childcare decision-making is a complex task and presents a number of
variables for parents to weigh: location, hours, price, licensing, type of provider,
and quality. Yet parents may have limited time during which to select childcare. 238
Certain features of childcare may be more salient, namely price and convenience,
because those are the aspects of childcare with which parents interact most
frequently, and because many families struggle to afford childcare. 239 By contrast,
the positive and negative externalities generated by childcare quality are
frequently hidden or not realized until later, making them less visible for parents
to consider when selecting childcare. 24 Further, the aspects of choice can vary
depending on whether the decision target is the parent (in which case, they are
more likely to focus on feasibility-whether the means of achieving a particular
choice are relatively easy) or the child (in which case, they are more likely to
focus on desirability-the value ofa choice's end state). 241 These salience effects
may cause some parents to over-emphasize some prominent features of childcare
while overlooking more critical indicia of quality, leading them to select childcare
that doesn't necessarily reflect the quality they desire.

°

c. Conformity and Social Norms

People have a tendency to conform-to do as others do. 242 They are
influenced by information about the choices others are making. 243 Especially
when people lack sufficient information, they may simply follow what other
people seem to think-whatever appears to be the most common or desirable
option. 244 Thus, social networks can be important sources of information and can
have normative influence over individual preferences and decisions. 245 Moreover,
in the context of deciding for others, social values theory predicts that such
decisions will be affected by a social norm expressing how people should decide
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for others. 146 Research on parental decision-making for children has found that
parental decisions are in fact influenced by what they perceive their peer groups
to value. 247
In the context of childcare decision-making, social networks and
communities play a significant role in childcare choice. With little information
about childcare, generally, or their children's care, specifically, parents may
simply go with what they know rather than engaging in a careful weighing of
options, costs, and benefits. 248 When facing these challenges, the default or status
quo exerts a powerful pull. 249 Parents are likely to go with what they know,
focusing on their own experiences, that of friends and family, and whatever is
prevalent in their communities. 250 Indeed, personal referrals are one of the most
common methods of locating childcare. 251 Particular communities may have
established norms preferring particular types of childcare, which will in tum
influence individual families in those communities to choose what they perceive
others in their community to be choosing. One could imagine any number of
community norms, e.g.: infants should always be cared for in small, home-like
environments; institutional care is important for toddlers because of socialization
and cognitive development; Head Start is an important precursor of school
readiness; or family members are always the best choice for childcare. 252
Studies confirm this intuition: Most parents begin childcare searches with
information from informal sources such as friends, family, and neighbors, and
ninety percent of them report learning about childcare from sources other than
formal resource and referral agencies. 253 Similarly, immigrant populations tend to
prefer childcare that is consistent with the culture and values represented by their
countries of origin, rather than American childcare norms and preferences. 254
Conforming to social norms and relying on communities for information
makes sense as a strategy for gathering information about childcare, and may
enhance childcare decisions and channel parents toward quality care. But, as is
the case more generally, reliance on these proxies may also cause parents to

246

Dore et al., supra note 178, at 478-79.

247

Id. at 481.

248

NUDGE, supra note 13, at 201.

249

See id. at 200-01.

25

°CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 12-13. So, for example, if many friends and family rely on a

local YMCA for care, parents in the selection process may be more likely to enroll their children in
the same facility because it is more salient and well-known to them. Id. at 12.
251

Parent Perceptions, supra note 4, at 4, 19.

252

See, e.g., CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 19.

253

FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 13, 25; Sosinsky, supra note 195, at 142.

254

FORRY ET AL., supra note 30, at 20-21.

Nudging Parents

105

overlook more reliable data on quality or simplify their searches in ways that
undercut their ultimate goals.

d. Status Quo Bias
Cognitive biases also deter people from making changes that would
maximize their expected utility. Because of status quo bias, people are much more
likely adhere to existing choices than to make changes. 255
In part, this is because we are loss averse-reluctant to surrender things we
already have. 256 We tend to place a greater negative value on losses than we would
place positive value on equivalent gains. 257 Like the status quo bias, loss aversion
may impede us from making changes, even when those changes would increase
our utility. Status quo bias and loss aversion contribute to inertia, a reluctance to
make changes even when in our interests. 258 People also tend to procrastinate,
incorrectly assuming they will take beneficial actions in the future. 259
Complicating these biases, people have bounded willpower. 26° Consequently,
they either put off or fail to take steps that would further their long-term goals. 261
Status quo bias, loss aversion, and procrastination may discourage parents
from changing childcare providers, even in the face concerns about safety or
quality. Parents will tend to prefer what they already have, or persist with the
default arrangement. 262 Indeed, several studies report that in general, parents have
little interest in changing providers. 263 When weighing a change, a parent
exhibiting loss aversion would give more weight to what she might miss about the
existing arrangement than what she might gain from a new one. 264 This may be
the case even if the existing arrangement is of marginal quality and the prospective
provider has the potential for better quality. 265 Complicating status quo bias,
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parents may be resistant to change because of countervailing concerns about
stability for their children or their families. 266
In sum, it appears that in some instances heuristics and biases work together
to distort initial judgments and ultimate decisions in the childcare market, likely
causing some parents' childcare decisions to diverge from the predictions of
rational choice theory. Imperfect rationality leads to distorted market behavior
and, consequently, distorts the childcare market in which that behavior takes
place. Thus, behavioral market failure is one explanation for the low demand for
quality in our childcare market.
An important insight from behavioral economics is that the existence of
behavioral market failure can inform the state's role. Enter the "nudge."
C. Behavioral Market Failure and the State: Introducing Nudges

When markets are inefficient, most economic theorists acknowledge that
government intervention can enhance efficiency. 267 This is true for behavioral, as
well as standard, market failure. 268
This reality necessarily has implications for state intervention. Legal rules
and policies can influence behavior and affect the production of social resources
and their efficient allocation. 269 Behavioralists argue that to the extent legal rules
and policies are designed in part based on their anticipated effects on behavior,
they ought to be informed by the contexts in which people actually form
judgments and make decisions. 27 Considering the contexts in which people form
judgements and make decision ought to facilitate a closer nexus between people's
ends and means, 271 enhancing market efficiency and overall welfare. 272 When
grounded in a more sophisticated account of how people actually make decisions,
public policy, governance, and lawmaking can be improved. 273
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Armed with an understanding of the limits of human cognition in judgment
and decision-making, law and policy can be formulated to "debias" people's
imperfect rationality 274 and steer them in welfare-promoting directions, 275 thereby
increasing efficiency. 276 In perhaps the most prominent and accessible
characterization of this approach, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have
introduced the concept of the nudge. 277 Nudges readjust the decision-making
context (a/k/a "choice architecture") so as to steer people toward decisions that
better reflect their true preferences. 278 "Choice architects" (i.e., policymakers)
structure the contexts in which people make decisions in ways that account for
imperfect rationality and self-control, improving efficiency and, ideally,
maximizing welfare. 279 Nudges are intended to be modest and inexpensive,
leaving room for individual agency and choice. 280 Importantly, nudges are never
compulsory. As defined by Sunstein and Thaler, a nudge is "any aspect of choice
architecture that alters people's behaviors in a predictable way without forbidding
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives." 281
Certain features of judgment and decision-making contexts make it more or
less likely that they will be affected by bounded rationality and bounded selfcontrol. Most broadly, people fall prey to cognitive errors when decisions are
complex, ambiguous, and difficult, and information is lacking. 282 Experience,
frequency, and feedback also matter, because difficult decisions become easier
with practice and people can learn from mistakes when feedback is clear and
immediate. 283 Bounded self-control is most likely to pose problems when people
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experience some benefits immediately and other consequences later, 284 and they
may also arise when people are in a "hot" state. 285
The context and characteristics of the childcare market create the background
conditions for imperfect rationality. First, childcare decisions are complex ones
in which parents must evaluate, among other things, the type of care, availability,
cost, convenience, and quality. Quality is one factor among many they must
weigh. The average parent has little information about how to locate quality
childcare. 286 Moreover, information about quality is hidden and sometimes
ambiguous. 287 As discussed above, parents are unlikely to receive substantial
feedback concerning quality because they are unable to observe directly whether
the care their children are receiving is, in fact, of high quality. Childcare quality
is also notoriously difficult to measure and report. We may know what poor or
unsafe childcare looks like when we see it, but assessing high quality is more
difficult.
Second, many first time parents will have little to no experience choosing
childcare, and are unlikely to accumulate significant information moving forward.
Families will likely face childcare decisions with relative infrequency because of
status quo bias and a tendency to prefer stability and consistency in childcare
arrangements. 288
And finally, the short-term benefits of childcare tend to be basic safety,
convenience, facilitation of parental work, and affordability. By contrast, the most
significant benefits and costs of childcare quality tend to accumulate over time.
In all these ways, childcare decision-making presents a powerful case for
debiasing: Parents could use a nudge toward higher-quality care. 289
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Ill. NUDGING PARENTS

Having made the theoretical case for nudging parents, the task of this
final Part is a more pragmatic one. In the discussion that follows, I consider how
we might translate insights from behavioral economics into concrete law and
policy initiatives for the childcare market. As in Part II, the discussion begins with
behavioral theory, exploring implications for the institutional design of nudges. It
then considers how these insights might inform childcare law and policy. Finally,
it considers potential objections.

A.

Behavioral Law & Economics: Designing Nudges

One of the primary contributions of behavioral law and economics is the
recognition that in the face of behavioral market failure, law and policy can be
carefully structured to nudge decision-makers in welfare-enhancing directions.
Armed with an understanding of the complexity and fallibility of human judgment
and decision-making, "behavioral bureaucrats" 290 or choice architects 291 can
deliberately shape the environments in which people make decisions and thereby
counteract behavioral market failure. 292 Taking a behaviorally-informed
perspective, law and policy deliberately account for the broader contexts in which
individuals make decisions. 293 As a backdrop to the recommendations below, this
Section explores how behavioral insights inform state interventions in behavioral
market failure, considering the overall goals, guiding principles, and methodology
for designing nudges. 294 I begin this exploration by considering what the overall
goals of such design should be, and I then examine the design process.
To suggest that an appropriate counter to behavioral market failure is to
nudge individuals' raises a central normative question: Nudge toward what? In
general, the overarching goal is to facilitate realization of an individuals' own,
true preferences 295-the ones they would pursue themselves, but for the foibles of
human judgment and decision-making. Consequently, a central premise of
behaviorally-informed market interventions is that choice architects should, as
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much as possible, worry about means rather than ends. 296 Nudges aim to leverage
choice architecture to counteract bounded rationality and self-control without
overriding personal choice or dramatically changing economic incentives. 297 In
most cases, then, the normative goal of nudges and choice architecture should
reflect the aggregate preferences of individuals themselves.
Of course, when designing law and policy, it isn't possible to discern the
preferences of each relevant individual. 298 This concern is even more pronounced
given that many of our preferences are ill-defined. For the purposes of this project,
I return to my initial observations in Part I. As discussed there, most parents report
desiring high quality childcare and understand quality in ways that largely overlap
with expert definitions. I will therefore consider developmentally-appropriate
quality as the lodestar for designing childcare nudges. 299
Moving from design goals to the design process, nudges will only be effective
to the extent they are informed by what we know about imperfect rationality. 300
Armed with an awareness of why people deviate from perfect rationality, we can
structure choice architecture so as to counteract the heuristics and biases that lead
to imperfect rationality. 301 Some nudges are best understood as efforts to curb
heuristics and biases, while others actively deploy heuristics and biases to redirect human judgment and decision-making. 302
In this regard, behavioral economics offers several general observations.
First, contrary to rational choice theory, in a variety of contexts people's
preferences are unclear and ill-formed rather than fixed. 303 When this is the case,
their choices will inevitably be affected by the context, process, and environment
in which they make decisions, whether constructed deliberately or not. 304 This
being the case, nudges should be strategically designed to facilitate welfare-
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enhancing choices. Second, because of what we know about imperfect rationality,
we should expect error. 305 Choice architecture must therefore be designed to
account for such missteps and accommodate change. Third, for the complex
choices that most frequently cause people to stumble, we should structure them to
make it easier for people to map their preferences onto available options by, for
example, making information about various alternatives more accessible. 306
Finally, policy interventions should be designed to provide feedback, which, as
discussed above, 307 enables people to learn from past missteps and to make more
consistent decisions going forward. 308
But well-designed nudges can do more than simply blunt the effects of
heuristics and biases. Instead, one task of behavioral law and economics is to
consider how to affirmatively leverage heuristics and biases, because although
they are certainly at the root of some judgment and decision-making errors, they
can also be promising part of the solution. 309 Strategic use of heuristics and biases
can counteract imperfect rationality. In particular, the availability heuristic,
framing effects, anchors, and social norms can be co-opted to assist people in
forming more accurate judgments and decisions.
First, the availability heuristic that sometimes leads people astray can also
work to improve judgment and decision-making. Strategically designing law and
policy such that certain information or features of a choice are more vivid and
salient can offset behavioral market failure. 31 Choice architects can become
"availability entrepreneurs." 311 Making long-term benefits more easily recalled
and accessible can help people overcome present bias and time inconsistency by
reminding them of the significance and desirability of these longer-term benefits.
Via availability, choice architects can also ensure that overlooked information is
more prominent and therefore factored into decision-making. Availability can
also counteract optimism bias by exposing decision-makers to concrete instances
of those circumstances that they underestimate. 312 And with both overoptimism
and probability problems, availability can make negative outcomes more
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cognitively accessible when people assess risk, leading them to more accurate
assessments. 313
Second, framing effects can positively influence judgment and decisionmaking. Choices depend in part on how they are presented. 314 Because we are
generally loss averse, framing consequences in terms of losses rather than gains
can have significant effects on decision-making. 315 Framing can be especially
helpful in addressing optimism bias by pressing decision-makers to confront the
potential negative consequences of their decisions. 316 Similarly, framing a choice
so as to highlights potential losses can facilitate more accurate assessments of
risk.311
Third and relatedly, anchors and defaults can improve judgments and
decisions. 318 As discussed above, people frequently make probability judgments
with reference to a starting point, or anchor. 319 They then make adjustments in the
direction that seems appropriate. 320 Using this heuristic can have dramatic results.
People will adjust an estimate from the anchor, but will nevertheless remain close
to it. 321 The status quo, or default, can thus act as a powerful anchor, influencing
contemplated changes in the direction of existing plans or policies, which come
to mind more easily than do new ones. 322 But the fact that anchors are so
influential for judgment and choice need not be a negative. 323 In fact, anchors can
serve as helpful nudges, correcting biased judgments and steering people toward
their true preferences. Simply by suggesting a starting point, choice architects can
influence decisions. 324
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Fourth and finally, heuristics and biases operate within the broader context
of social norms, which themselves can act as powerful nudges. 325 Individual
behavior frequently is influenced by more general social views and attitudes. 326
Because we internalize social norms 327 and seek social approval, social nonns can
in tum affect individual construction of preferences. 328 Social norms impact
individuals, telling them what to value. 329 This ability to affect preferences and
behaviors makes social norms a potentially powerful tool in countering imperfect
rationality. 330 Peer pressure can influence choice and change minds. Likewise,
simply having information about what others are doing can impact choice. 331 Law
can be self-consciously designed to either support or counteract social norms; it
may also be deployed to create and influence their development in the first
place. 332
With these general lessons from Behavioral Law and Economics in hand, I
tum now to apply them in the context of childcare market interventions.
B. Childcare Market Nudges

A central lesson of this project is that conventional market failure
interventions can address some, but not all, of the childcare market's
dysfunctions. When we supplement our understanding of conventional market
failure with an account of parents' imperfect rationality, it becomes clear that the
impact of conventional remedies like subsidies, information, and regulation will
be limited at best. From a behaviorally-informed perspective, simply providing
subsidies to encourage the purchase of higher-quality care is a band-aid. Subsidies
may increase demand for quality by altering parents' incentives, but do nothing
to re-calibrate the way parents actually form judgments and make decisions about
childcare. 333 Regulation can act as a backstop against poor quality care, but as
currently configured does little to inform parental decision-making. 334 And once
we understand that parents will filter information about childcare through a

325

Id. at 43.

326 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1127.
327

Id. at 1130.

328 Id. at 1130-31.
329 CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 5, at 19.

°Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 1131.
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331 NUDGE, supra note 13, at 54, 59-60, 65-68.
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Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 211-12.
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cognitive process complicated by heuristics and biases, we recognize that simply
providing information, without more, is likely to be inadequate. 335
Having now theorized behavioral market failure in our childcare market, the
practical task is to translate theory into Jaw and policy prescriptions. Rather than
somehow insulating parents from poor choices and bad outcomes ex post, 336 a
behaviorally informed response would target imperfect rationality head-on. 337
In the discussion that follows, I draw on lessons from behavioral law and
economics to sketch out potential enhancements to our childcare law and
policy. 338 Choice architects have a broad menu of nudges from which to choose.
Here, I discuss those most apposite to the childcare market: strategic information
disclosures, social norms, warnings, and procedural nudges. 339
I.

Strategic Information Disclosures

To the extent people's imperfect rationality and self-control can lead them to
ignore Jong-term benefits and overlook important information, the strategic
provision of information is one antidote to behavioral market failure. 340
Consequently, an important task for choice architects is to move beyond the
straightforward provision of information to prescribing how it should be provided.

335

See Jolls et al., supra note 110, at 1533-34; Sun stein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1182.

336
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children need the right incentives." NUDGE, supra note 13, at 206.
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secondary, and college education. See, e.g.. Hastings et al., supra note 169; Philip Oreopoulos,
Behavioral Economics of Education: Progress and Possibilities (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 8853,
Feb. 2015); Huriya Jabbar, The Behavioral Economics of Education: New Directions for Research, 40
EDUC. RESEARCHER 446 (2011).

339 See Sunstein, supra note 133, at 1832, 1835; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 123, at 1189. Defaults
are another popular nudging device, but one which is not especially apposite for the childcare market.
Defaults can be especially effective in counteracting present bias. Amir & Lobel, supra note 127, at
2120.
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See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 202-03; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 113, at 132;
Rachlinski, Uncertain, supra note 133, at 1176. This intervention is not unique to behavioral market
failure. Recall that one response to the information deficits in the childcare market-a conventional
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From a behavioral perspective, the problem is that parents suffer from excessive complexity and pay
insufficient attention to the information they have about quality. Consequently, the purpose of using
information as a nudge is to make childcare quality more salient and accessible.
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The manner in which information is provided is critically important. 341 By
leveraging availability, choice architects can highlight overlooked information in
ways that make it more vivid and salient. 342 Strategic information disclosures can
refocus individuals on overlooked information. Better information and
disclosures can improve feedback, empowering people to learn from past
decisions and to improve their decision-making process. 343 They can also help
mitigate cognitive overload by simplifying information to facilitate a more
straightforward choice. 344
These insights have led to the development of "targeted transparency"
nudges, which provide targeted, simplified disclosures at the time of decisionmaking to move parties toward better decisions and providers toward improved
services. 345 In the analogous context of primary and secondary public school
choice, for example, targeted transparency has been shown to reduce the costs of
acquiring and processing comparative information on school options, thereby
increasing demand for higher-achieving schools and ultimately enhancing student
achievement. 346 These nudges also have the potential to pressure lower-quality
providers to increase quality or lose students. 347
Thus, perhaps the most useful-and least intrusive-childcare market nudges
would come in the form of information. One of the most promising avenues for
enhancing and refining the information parents have about childcare quality is to
build on existing and proposed Quality Rating Improvement Systems (QRIS).
State-administered QRIS systems are "a framework for organizing, guiding, and

341
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342
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transparency. Id. at 582. The goal is to make information on health risks more accessible and salient,
which in tum should lead consumers to select restaurants accordingly, and incentivize underperforming restaurants to improve. Id. As Professor Daniel Ho's exhaustive empirical study of
restaurant grades has illustrated, however, existing grading systems are far from a panacea, and suffer
from a variety of flaws as currently designed and implemented. Id. at 586-88.
346
Justine S. Hastings & Jeffrey M. Weinstein, Information. School Choice, and Academic
Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1373, 1374 (2008). Providing
simplified information to parents about school quality (in the form of academic achievement)
significantly increased their demand for academic achievement. See Hastings et al., supra note 169, at
24, 26-27 (finding that simplified information impacts parental choice and preferences, primarily by
lowering information and decision-making costs); see also NUDGE, supra note 13, at 202-03
(discussing same study).
347
Hastings & Weinstein, supra note 346, at 1376. Of course, even with simplified and more accessible
information, studies also suggest that parents must in fact have a range of high-quality, available
options from which to actually choose. Id.
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gauging the progress of early care and education initiatives." 348 Via QRIS
programs, states collect information about childcare quality and then
communicate that information to childcare consumers, enabling them to
distinguish among providers in their communities according to the level of quality
care provided. 349 About half of the states have implemented QRIS systems and
most of the remaining states have pilot programs or plans for implementation. 350
QRIS programs and other, similar approaches can present information
strategically to counteract bounded rationality in the childcare market. First, these
programs can help ensure that parents are mindful of important but often
overlooked information-information about childcare quality in addition to, say,
cost, location, hours, etc. These systems highlight this neglected information,
describing standards used to assess childcare quality such as provider
qualifications, learning environment, curricula, and activities, as well as
explaining how childcare quality is assessed. Second, through broad accessibility,
these programs use availability to make developmentally significant quality more
salient for parents and families. And there may be also opportunities to nudge
parents toward particular childcare arrangements of high quality by framing
programs in particular ways. 351
Third, these systems can enhance the accuracy of probabilistic judgments and
decisions about quality by keying them to evidence-based quality indicators.
Fourth, the QRIS approach can help parents structure complex choices by
enabling them to map their preferences onto the menu of available options. 352
Finally, to the extent parents have already made childcare decisions, QRIS
information can provide them with feedback on the level of quality care they have
selected in the form of a quality rating for their selected childcare provider.
2. Information Campaigns and Social Norms
Broader public information campaigns about the significance and features of
childcare quality could similarly counteract behavioral market failure. 353 These
campaigns could suggest characteristics to seek in initial placements, as well as

348

See Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF) Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 29, 442, 29462 (May 20,
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349
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what to expect from such placements. 354 First, by making the features and
cumulative effects of quality childcare more salient, these campaigns would
highlight overlooked information and help to blunt present bias by emphasizing
the longer-term benefits of quality care. Second, using Joss aversion and framing
to focus on potential losses associated with unlicensed, unsafe, and lower-quality
care could help counteract excessive optimism and recalibrate probability
assessments. 355 Finally, to the extent some families' preferences concerning
childcare quality are ill-formed, information campaigns might nudge families
toward higher-quality care. Such campaigns would, again, use availability to
make quality more salient.
Information campaigns might take a variety of forms. Federal agencies like
the Administration for Children and Families' Office of Child Care could initiate
a national-level conversation about childcare quality. State agencies might also
devise state-wide initiatives aimed at increasing the salience of quality care. Or
campaigns might be geared more narrowly toward particular sources of
information, like QRIS programs. Most parents are unaware of existing state and
local QRIS systems, 356 and researchers and agency actors are still working to
understand how to make QRIS programming more family friendly. 357 States
might devise public awareness campaigns for QRIS in ways that emphasize
particular features of quality care. 358 Finally, local, community-based
initiatives-yard signs, open houses, and the like-could be used to make quality
more salient. 359
Information campaigns can also go beyond simply informing to attempts at
persuasion via social norms. 360 Importantly, strategic information disclosures can
provide information about family priorities in choosing childcare (highlighting
multiple studies indicating that parents rate quality as important, e.g.), thereby
communicating a social norm of selecting quality childcare, potentially enhancing
and solidifying that norm. 361 In tum, social networks would communicate this
norm to individual community members, signaling particular choices for quality

354
Indeed, information campaigns are especially important for initial decisions, given that endowment
effects and status quo bias may discourage parents from leaving suboptimal childcare settings. See
supra notes 245, 256, 269 and accompanying text.
355
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358 Id. at 26 (explaining how a recent public awareness project in Utah led to fewer children in informal
childcare arrangements, and increased parental awareness of quality provided in their existing care
arrangements).
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childcare. 362 We know that parents receive most of their information about
childcare from informal sources in their community-friends, family, and
neighbors. 363 Thus, to the extent particular quality childcare arrangements become
a community norm, more parents may be nudged toward selecting them.
3. Required Warnings
Especially the face of overoptimism and probability miscalculations,
information disclosures alone may be insufficient to check bounded rationality.
In this context, translating information into more assertive warnings can nudge
people toward their desired ends. 364 Warnings counteract excessive optimism and
thus lead to more accurate risk assessments by highlighting risk factors and
explaining how negative outcomes might occur. 365 Consumer safety regulations
requiring information disclosures and warnings employ these types of nudges
because consumers often do not adequately appreciate the risks posed by using
certain products. 366
Warnings hold promise as an effective counter to overoptimism and
probability mistakes in the childcare context. Like information disclosures,
warnings can make information on the incidence and effects of low-quality
childcare more salient. Warning leverage loss aversion: By directing attention to
potential dangers and losses, they can help steer families toward higher-quality
childcare. For example, in conjunction with licensing efforts, states might
establish childcare "blacklists" highlighting the most egregious examples of
unsafe and low quality childcare. When childcare advocates and the media target
these providers, the blacklist can serve as a useful social nudge. 367
4. Procedural Nudges
State law and policy can also address imperfect rationality by including
certain procedural mechanisms within choice architecture. When people confront
complex choices, these mechanisms are designed to ensure that those choices are

362
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363
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364
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NUDGE, supra note 13, at 191 (explaining that providers will want to avoid the consequences of
bad publicity and will be motivated to avoid making the blacklist, creating a sort of competition to
"race to the top"). Policymakers must take care, however, to focus on providers and avoid
inadvertently creating a new front for the "Mommy Wars" or otherwise stigmatize the children and
families using suboptimal care.
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rational, voluntary, and pursue expected utility. 368 They might include defaults in
the event that no choice is made, with the default based on an estimation of
expected goals. 369 They might force people to actively choose so as to avoid
inertia and status quo bias. 370 They might require individuals to confirm their
receipt and understanding of certain information before making a choice. Or they
might simply ensure that material information is salient by priming decision
makers.
In the childcare market, the state could use procedural constraints via the
documentation required when parents interact with the state to seek childcare
subsidies through the CCDF or the federal income tax system. Subsidy
applications and paperwork could anchor licensed and/or accredited care as the
default or starting point choice, e.g., by soliciting or requiring licensing
information before subsidies will be provided. If, by contrast, parents have opted
for unlicensed care, procedural nudges might require active disclosure of this fact
and an explanation. Similarly, this documentation could request information
about public and private accreditation via QRIS ratings or organizations like the
National Association for Education of Young Children.
Regardless of the type or quality of care ultimately selected, the presence of
these constraints would prime parents to consider quality in their decision-making
calculus, and make quality proxies like licensing more salient. In one study of
childcare preferences, for example, simply asking parents to complete a
questionnaire gave them a clearer perspective on childcare quality: "Completing
the questionnaire linked the concept [of quality] to their experience, gave
articulation to their perceptions, or reinforced what they privately observed and
hesitantly believed." 371 In other words, simply completing a survey can nudge
parents to consider childcare features they may have overlooked. 372
For subsidies, yet another option would be to employ "hard" paternalism
through financial incentives by keying or conditioning subsidy payments to the
use of higher-quality providers. 373 Indeed, the Office of Child Care encourages
states to account for quality in determining subsidy rates. 374 Proponents of a more

368
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369
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narrow or conservative understanding of nudges would respond, however, that
financial incentives would change individuals' motivation for making particular
choices, but not necessarily the actual process by which they make those
choices. 375
Finally, an important lesson from behavioral law and economics is that we
should expect parents to make mistakes. 376 Subsidy architects should anticipate
these errors by putting mechanisms in place to facilitate changes to childcare
arrangements, ensuring such changes can be effected expeditiously and without
risk of losing substantial subsidy monies.
Armed with what we know from behavioral economics, these enhancements
have the potential to better support parental decision-making and facilitate
parents' pursuit and realization of their childcare goals. Because the effects of
behaviorally informed law and policy in the childcare context have not yet been
studied empirically, these are, necessarily, a preliminary set of recommendations.
Going forward, it will be important to carefully test new initiatives for their
efficacy and ensure that their benefits outweigh any experienced costs. 377
In conclusion, using behavioral law and economics to reform childcare law
and policy holds promise in mitigating behavioral market failure. But of course,
actively exploiting law to influence individual judgment and decisions is not
without controversy and risk. In the discussion below, I anticipate and respond to
important concerns about nudging parents.
C. Objections: Nudging Parents?

As the concept of nudging makes plain, the argument of behavioral law and
economics analysis is that it is legitimate-and indeed desirable-for government
to attempt to influence choice. 378 Those who advocate nudging are unapologetic
in their call for self-conscious efforts by the state to steer people toward their
desired ends. 379 But these prescriptions raise important questions about individual
autonomy and the legitimacy of state intervention. 380 Some of the most important
objections to nudges concern paternalism, pluralism, and the risk of government
error. Each of these objections has special significance in the family context.
Below I explore these critiques and then respond to them.
375
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377
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Paternalism

The paternalism critique centers around the legitimacy of state efforts to
influence choice and behavior, 381 which potentially interferes with individual
autonomy and agency. 382 For many, freedom of choice is an important component
of individual welfare, at the least, or more broadly an end in itself-a bedrock
principle oflibertarianism. 383 Though the paternalism critique takes on a different
cast in this context (after all, there are third parties involved in childcare
decisions), there is another, related source of resistance as least as powerful:
family liberty and autonomy.
This objection is especially sharp in the context of the state role in parental
decision-making. Privacy and nonintervention norms predominate both family
law and social ideology around the state's relationship to families. 384 Broadly, the
family privacy doctrine provides a backstop against government interference,
protecting private family decisions. 385 More specifically, the right of fit parents to
make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children is "an
enduring American tradition," 386 and "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests." 387 Parental decisions concerning childrearing are central to this
right, especially in the face of second-guessing or overriding by the state. 388 To
carry the critique forward, surely nudges have the potential to be especially
worrisome in the context of parental decision-making about childcare.
As conceptualized, nudges are deliberately designed to include checks
against undue paternalism. First, the primary goal of nudges is to tweak
individuals' means but not their ends--enhancing their welfare as the individuals
themselves see it, not the state. 389 The idea is to facilitate the maximization of
individuals' own preferences. Second, the paternalism envisioned by nudges is
libertarian in that it preserves freedom of choice and allows individuals to opt

381
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382
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out. 390 Thus, nudges may steer toward or encourage a particular choice, but they
don't mandate it. Third, nudges constitute "soft" or "asymmetric" paternalism.
They avoid material costs on individual choice, 391 and impose minimal costs on
those decision-makers who are more closely aligned with the homo economicus
model of rationality and self-control. 392 Thus, like other market actors, parents
would ultimately be free to tum in different directions.
More broadly, in many domains, some sort of influence is unavoidable. 393
That is to say, choice architecture is inevitable. 394 As a result, the ways in which
legal rules and policies are designed necessarily will influence people's
choices. 395 For many choices, the government must at a minimum provide a
starting point. 396 Likewise, as behavioral economics makes clear, there is no
neutral way to provide information. 397 As discussed above, social norms are
pervasive and powerfully influential. 398 In short, nudges-both intentional and
unintentional-are everywhere. 399 That being the case, it is far better to
deliberately structure them to maximize welfare, as reflected by aggregate
preferences. 400
A different response to these critiques comes from family law and policy
itself: Family privacy, generally, and parental autonomy, specifically, are not
monoliths. 401 Preferences favoring nonintervention and autonomy don't always

390
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trump the state's separate and independent interest in child wellbeing. 402 In fact,
the state intervenes regularly in questions of child custody, support, and child
welfare to override parental decisions when they aren't in the best interests of
children. These interventions are justified by the state's role as parens patriaeto protect those who are legally incapable of protecting themselves. 403 Indeed,
such interventions, even going so far as to override ends or goals, are consistent
with economic interventions that are justified when third party effects are
apparent. 404 To the extent these interventions are steering parents toward their
children' interests rather than their own, perhaps they are not paternalistic at all.
2.

Pluralism

A second concern with nudging is that to the extent government seeks proxies
for welfare in designing policy, nudging toward a one-size-fits-all solution will
reduce welfare. 405 Different people have different circumstances and preferences,
and will balance them in different ways. 406 In any number of contexts, people may
simply disagree as to what best advances their welfare. 407
As with paternalism, this concern takes on a special dimension in the family
law context. Indeed, the genesis of the family liberty cases arose in an era in which
concerns about state totalitarianism were manifest, and families were linked
countervailing democratic values. 408 Concerns about standardizing children were
explicit in these debates. 409 Family pluralism and parental autonomy in the face
of state hegemony acted as a check against a homogenized population. 410 Studies
confirm that childcare preferences vary according to a number of family
characteristics: the child(ren), parental employment, parental stress and beliefs,
family income, socioeconomic status, family structure, and community. 411 In the
view of the pluralism critique, the concern is that when choice architects make
generalizations about what most parents "want," they will not only override some
individual choices but also tend to standardize childcare decisions in ways that
are troubling from a pluralism perspective.

402
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Again, translated for the childcare decision-making context, childcare nudges
would seek to advance parents' own goals vis-a-vis childcare: to locate and secure
quality childcare for their children. 412 Parents would be free ultimately to make
individualized decisions about childcare, even in the face of nudges in different
directions. Additionally, parents who are acting rationally would not suffer
materially for making choices that depart from the direction of nudges. Retaining
this ultimate autonomy would ensure that to the extent that families have
pluralistic preferences and values as to childcare, they continue to be expressed.
What is more, nudges will operate in a childcare market that will continue to
respond to consumer preferences, therefore presenting a range of childcare
alternatives from which parents can choose. 413

3. Error and Bias
A third critique worries about government error and bias. 414 Public choice
theory posits that public officials have agendas and biases just like the rest ofus. 415
First, they are no less human than others, and are unlikely to be immune to the
same heuristics and biases that can lead to errors in judgment and decisionmaking.416 Second, public officials and agencies are susceptible to capture by
powerful private interest groups and may therefore not make decisions to further
the public's own goals. 417 And finally, critics worry that rather than working to
facilitate the achievement of individuals' goals, government will act to further its
own in ways that don't prioritize the general welfare. 418 Because nudges often are
subtle, overreach is a special concem. 419
As above, concerns about government error and bias take on a special
character in the case of the family. Not infrequently, the state has stepped in to
substitute its own judgments and values for those of parents and family members,
to the harm of both families and children. Indeed, the presumption that fit parents
act in the best interests of their children is intended to guard against just these
sorts of harmful substitute judgments. To permit the state to nudge parental
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childcare decisions is to raise the specter of a government influenced by its own
biases-both cognitive and cultural-nudging parents in its own desired
directions rather than parents'.
The primary response to the error and bias problem is to again observe that
nudges preserve freedom of choice and so to the extent that choice architects err,
those errors need not necessarily be visited on the choosers. 420 A second response
to concerns about error and bias extols the virtues of technocrats. These specialists
in particular disciplines can work to overcome error in judgments and decisions. 421
Because technocrats will be well-versed in behavioral economics, they will be in
a better position than most to self-correct for imperfect rationality and bounded
self-control. And indeed, one aim of the regulatory agency model is to insulate
these technocrats from political and popular pressure. 422 A third response is to line
up the incentives of choice architects so that they put aside their own agendas and
look to facilitate the general welfare. 423 Fourth and finally, behavioral law and
economics makes explicit that nudges and choice architecture should be designed
to ensure transparency and enable monitoring to guard against error, bias, and
overreach. 424 The constitutional framework, and in particular judicial review of
agency action, can help to counteract error in choice architecture. 425
In sum, childcare nudges and choice architecture would seek to balance
concerns about imperfect rationality on the one hand, and parental agency on the
other. By definition, nudges are not shoves. 426 Instead, they seek to insulate
judgment and choice from the most detrimental effects of heuristics and biases,
while empowering parents to maximize their utility by choosing the quality and
category of care they desire.
CONCLUSION

While most all parents would concede they're far from perfect, they strive to
do right by their children. Studies confirm that parents endeavor to act in the best
interests of their children when selecting childcare: Quality is one of their top
priorities-often the top priority. Yet we also know that parents, like the rest of
us, will be influenced by heuristics and biases when they make decisions-often
to their benefit, but sometimes to their detriment. Taking a behaviorally informed
420
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approach to childcare market interventions can help parents overcome imperfect
rationality when selecting and securing quality care for their children.
In the end, no single analytical frame alone can adequately respond to the
childcare market's failings. 427 Indeed, many families will be unable to access the
quality they seek unless or until they have the resources to do so. But adding
behavioral insights to the childcare law and policy toolkit is one step toward a
better functioning childcare market and a better network to care for, develop, and
nurture America's children.

427
As a society we must confront our collective shortsightedness as reflected in the country's overall
level of childcare funding; greater investments now would yield considerable long-term benefits for
America's children, families, communities, and society at large.

